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THROUGH CHAPTER 11 WITH GUN OR
CAMERA, BUT PROBABLY NOT BOTH: A FIELD
GUIDE
JOHN D. AYER*
If I have not seen farther than I do,
It is because giants were standing
on my shoulders.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two lines of modem bankruptcy scholarship, sometimes
mischaracterized as the "economic" and the "other." The distinction is
important, but the names are not quite right. The real distinction is
between those who think that the bankruptcy process can be neatly
modeled, and those who do not. Call them "clarifiers" and "complicators."
I offer these names for convenience only, and at the risk of seeming
pejorative. I hope I will not be misunderstood here, because the fact is that
I think both lines of endeavor have helped us to understand bankruptcy
law. The clarifiers have been identified with economics-more precisely,
with finance-because the clarifications they undertake to offer come from
the genre of economics. But I think that this identification is more
epiphenomenal than essential: I think it is perfectly conceivable that one
might do "clarifying" scholarship from the standpoint of, say, an abstract
model of justice in moral philosophy.
The "complicators" risk suffering more from the name I just gave them:
here I refer to scholars who are not so much seeking actively to complicate,
but rather resisting the clarification, insisting that an activity as alive as
bankruptcy is simply not amenable to any conventional trope. Their
numbers are diverse: they include allies as unlikely as Elizabeth Warren
and David Gray Carlson; perhaps their dominant voice (if they have one)
is Donald Korobkin. Their positive programs differ, and are not easily
summarized; their negative program is perhaps best captured in Nietzsche's
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. This paper was made possible in part by
a grant from the Dean's summer research fund at UC-Davis. It was made impossible in part by my
own failings of intellect and character, with generous support from the doctrine of original sin. Thanks
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jibe about "Egyptianism."'
The purpose of this paper is to offer some clarification in the interest of
complication. As much as I admire some of the law and economics
scholarship, my sympathies are with those who believe that bankruptcy is,
in the end, richer than its models. I think that the way to make this point
is to try to specify some of the numberless tasks that bankruptcy is called
upon to perform, coupled with some suggestions of their complications and
ambiguities. What I offer here, then, is a typology-a field guide, of
sorts-to show some of the various tasks that bankruptcy is called upon to
perform, and how it undertakes to perform them. By clarifying things in
this way, I hope to make it less clear that bankruptcy will reduce itself to
a simple model.
Because it is the focal point of most recent discussion, I focus my
attention on Chapter 11. But, as I will show, it is impossible to extricate
Chapter 11 from its place in the Bankruptcy Code as a whole; hence, a
number of my examples will necessarily derive from a number of other
parts of the Bankruptcy Code.
II. THE "NATURE" OF BANKRUPTCY
As a preliminary matter, let me say a few words about what bankruptcy
(as distinct from Chapter 11) "is." At the risk of repeating myself too
often, my ultimate point is that bankruptcy "isn't" in any internally self-
contained sense. But in order to make that point, I need to suggest some
of the various overlapping meanings that the term may denote. To
understand this point, consider these cases:
CASE IA: Guillemot, an individual, owes $800,000 to unsecured creditors.
All debts were incurred at a time when he sincerely expected to pay them,
and had good reason for this expectation. He has no prospect of any future
earnings.
CASE IB: Auklet is a corporation, formerly a manufacturer and distributor
of widgets. Auklet has ceased operation and has no prospect of beginning
anew. It has $5 million in debts and perhaps $1 million in assets-leftover
inventory, forklift trucks, an unexpired, valuable long-term leasehold,
customer lists, and so forth.
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 1, quoted in M. FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE,
COUNTERMEMORY, PRAcncE 156 (1977), cited in David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1389 n.140 (1987).
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CASE IC: Vireo, an individual, operated as a broker. Over the years, he
handled large quantities of money in a variety of complex transactions.
Those who did business with him believe that he kept most of his accounts
in his head. Lately he has not been meeting his obligations as they come
due. Evidence (and rumors) about his difficulties abound. It appears that
he is reducing inventory and turning his hard assets into cash. Some say that
he has been concealing money via sham transactions. There is reason to
believe that he is favoring some creditors over others.
CASE ID: Flycatcher is a corporation actively engaged in the manufacture
and sale of widgets. It owes $5 million to creditors, all unsecured. It would
be worth $4 million if it could be sold as a going concern. The individual
components would yield a total of only $1.5 million in liquidation.
All four of these examples bear the marks of familiar bankruptcy cases.
Yet their relationship to the bankruptcy process is more complex than may
appear at first blush. Taking them in turn, Guillemot's case seems to
represent the most typical case of all: an individual with debts beyond his
capacity to repay, who will seek bankruptcy relief in order to get the
bankruptcy discharge. Probably the vast majority of bankruptcy cases
represent no more than this. Indeed, it may be that the power to give a
discharge is the only thing really unique to the "bankruptcy power"
conferred by the Constitution on Congress.2 Yet if we take the long view,
the discharge is not the most typical sort of bankruptcy, but the least. The
discharge came late to the bankruptcy party. In its modem form, it arrived
in American bankruptcy law only in 1898. Two hundred years ago, no one
would have thought to take bankruptcy voluntarily as a form of relief.
Auklet suggests a more traditional use of the bankruptcy power: a
mechanism for the "orderly" (whatever that means) collection and
disposition of assets.' It is readily conceivable that the managers (or the
creditors) will decide that the best thing to do with the assets of Auklet is
to put the firm under the control of the court, so that an independent trustee
may collect the assets and distribute them to the creditors as their interests
may appear. Yet such a result is not inevitable, either from the standpoint
of the creditor or from that of the debtor. It is entirely conceivable, in
principle, that the old managers will simply undertake the collection and
distribution on their own initiative. Such a result may be cheaper for the
2. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
3. I do not mean to suggest any antipathy to the idea of orderliness. My present point is only
that it can mean many things, depending on the particular premises.
1994]
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creditors who, if they trust the managers, may be delighted to avoid the
extra expense of a bankruptcy proceeding. It may accommodate the
managers, who may be delighted with the prospect of a few weeks' extra
employment during the liquidation of the company.
Moreover, even if there is need for an independent third party to
liquidate and distribute the estate, it is not inevitable that the third party be
a bankruptcy trustee. Informal assignments for the benefit of creditors
probably occur in all states, and are regulated (if lightly) in some. In
particular cases, a state-law receiver may perform the same role.
One source of perplexity is the relationship between state and federal
payout schemes. The Bankruptcy Code accords certain creditors priority
in bankruptcy distribution. Many nonbankruptcy statutes, state and federal,
define priorities for collective liquidations outside the bankruptcy court.
These nonbankruptcy schemes present a conundrum. It is axiomatic that
bankruptcy respects rights established under state law. Yet if bankruptcy
carries over the state-law priority scheme, what exactly is the point of the
bankruptcy? A number of courts have wrestled with this difficulty,
seemingly without providing a full resolution.4
So, a bankruptcy is not a necessary precondition for an orderly
distribution.' As for the discharge aspect-with respect to Auklet, a
discharge is neither necessary nor possible. It is not possible because the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits a discharge for a liquidating corporation.' It
is not necessary because a corporation is a limited liability entity that
receives its own "discharge" when it is wound up.
An added complication is that even if Auklet goes into bankruptcy, the
creditors may prefer to leave existing management intact (so as to minimize
expense) rather than to suffer the appointment of a trustee. They may be
able to do so, but only under the pretense that the business is "reorganiz-
ing" rather than liquidating. This is so because the Code permits the debtor
(i.e., the former managers) to remain in possession with the powers and
4. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 51-57 (1979) (holding that state law, not
federal rules of equity, is determinative of whether security interests in property extend to the rents and
profits derived from that property); In re Loretto Winery Ltd., 898 F.2d 715, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1990)
(noting that federal bankruptcy law recognizes social, economic, or political policies that require
deviation from a rule of equity and that it recognizes state statutory liens which meet certain criteria).
See also Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bargain,
91 YALE L.J. 857, 905-06 (1982) (commenting on the confusion surrounding the role of state rights in
federal bankruptcy decisions).
5. Nor sufficient either, I suspect, but that is another story.
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141(d)(3) (1988).
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/8
FIELD GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11
obligations of a trustee-but only if the case is administered under Chapter
11, the reorganization chapter of the Code.7
The relevance of Vireo's case to the bankruptcy process is easy to
demonstrate. On its face, this is precisely the case where creditors (and the
sovereign) might want to deploy an independent officer to take charge of
the debtor's affairs. Such an officer might be given the power to prevent
the dissipation or concealment of assets, and to serve some principle of
"equity" in distribution. In short, the officer would fulfill precisely the
mandate of the traditional bankruptcy trustee. Yet it is worth noting that
some or all of these processes may occur even if bankruptcy never
intervenes. Many nonbankruptcy laws are designed to prevent the
dissipation of assets. Laws prohibiting fraudulent transfers and bulk
transfers are perhaps the most obvious. Laws restricting the payment of
corporate dividends fall into the same class. Laws allowing for the
sequestration of assets pending litigation, or for the examination of debtors
or third parties, may serve the same function.
Conceding that nonbankruptcy devices may be sufficient to police against
dissipation or wrongdoing, it is still commonly thought that the bankruptcy
process is necessary to set aside preferences in the interest of "equitable
distribution." Apparently, this is not quite right. California confers the
power to avoid a preference on a state-law assignee! No court has held
that a nonbankruptcy preference avoidance law is impermissible in the face
of the constitutional bankruptcy power.
If the going-concern value exceeds the value in liquidation, as in
Flycatcher's case, a somewhat more subtle problem is presented. At first
blush, it would seem that all parties should agree that there are good
reasons to preserve the going-concern value, even though the old residual
owners will receive nothing. On the other hand, it is likely that individual
creditors, left to their own devices, will be motivated to collect their claims
piecemeal-and entirely possible that piecemeal liquidation by some
creditors will destroy the going-concern values otherwise available to all.
This is commonly supposed to be a good reason for filing a Chapter 11
case-that is, to get the protection of the automatic stay, preventing
unilateral creditor action pending sale. This is indeed a good reason for
filing a bankruptcy, but it does not follow that the case must be filed in
Chapter I.
7. See discussion infra pp. 892-93.
S. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.07 (West 1986).
9. See discussion of Case 3A infra pp. 892-93.
1994]
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All of these cases, then, make plausible claims on a system of bankrupt-
cy administration, although none makes a really convincing claim to be the
"essence" of bankruptcy. The plot thickens when one recognizes that these
various purposes may overlap, interweave, and sometimes conflict. It is
easy to imagine, for example, an individual who needs the protection of a
discharge, but who serves also as the repository of certain going-concern
values. And it is entirely conceivable that this individual may have
dissipated or concealed estate property in a manner that thoroughly
frustrates creditors. Yet, despite their animosities, the creditors may be
impelled to work with him for some supposed larger good: such is the
healing power of money. Indeed, treating bankruptcy as a form of theater,
the most compelling performances may occur when the parties cordially
despise each other, yet understand that they must work together anyway.'
It is possible to identify any number of places where this conflation of
motives and purposes may distort the law. We leave discussion of these
until we have examined some of the internal tensions in Chapter 11 itself.
III. CHAPTER 11
A. The Paradigm Case
Consider, first, what may be the model of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
CASE 2: Veery, Inc. is the world's largest maker of mandolin picks. It owes
$2.7 million to OldBank, secured by Blackacre, on which its factory is
located. It owes $4 million to LoanCo, secured by inventory and receivables.
It owes $2 million to a variety of unsecured trade creditors. Blackacre would
sell for $3.5 million. The inventory and receivables carry a book value of
$3.5 million. Veery always kept current on all of its claims until last year,
when a series of calamities caused its operating cash flow to fall. Cash flow
has since risen to historic levels, but the episode left Veery with an
extraordinary backlog of debt. Veery engaged in several ad hoc devices to
continue operating under the burden. It slowed payment on trade debt (from
30 days to 45 days, then to 60 days). On occasion it paid particularly
importunate creditors to preserve the continuation of necessary supply lines,
or to prevent levy on critical assets. In a few cases, it was able to make
10. In this vein, a number of observers have remarked on the comparison to, or contrast with,
divorce. As a practical matter, it probably would be a convenience for the client if the divorce court
were built next door to the Chapter 13 court. But in both cases, the task is to allocate assets and blame
on a substrate of disappointment. An unstudied aspect of the relationship concerns the place of
involuntary bankruptcy. See infra pp. 893-94 & n.21.
[VOL. 72:883
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/8
FIELD GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11
deals with individual creditors, scaling down old obligations in exchange for
ready cash.
Veery's contract with LoanCo provides that LoanCo will lend no more
than eighty percent of the book value of the inventory and receivables.
Veery has been out of ratio for months. LoanCo let things slide at first,
knowing that it had to show some flexibility if it intended to preserve the
customer relationship, and if it expected to get full value out of the collateral
(see below). Veery is certain, however, that LoanCo will call the loan soon.
About two months ago, Veery called an informal meeting of creditors and
proposed a compromise: for all outstanding unsecured debt, it would pay
forty cents on the dollar now with the balance paid in three annual install-
ments of twenty cents on the dollar per year. To all appearances, a large
number of Veery's creditors want to take the deal, but there is some vigorous
dissent.
This case, if any, bears the earmarks of an old-fashioned "paradigm
Chapter 11 bankruptcy." The debtor is a moderate-sized firm. In terms
of current cash flow, the debtor seems able to operate without difficulty.
The problem arises because of an (allegedly) isolated episode of misfortune.
The burden seems to have fallen most harshly on "the trade"-unsecured
creditors, typically suppliers."
To understand this case, it is useful to begin by understanding that
everyone has motivations that may not be obvious to the untutored eye.
For example, the debtor's strongest card is the threat of suicide-the threat
of going down with guns blazing and flags flying, taking the loot with it
to Davey Jones' locker.'2 The business is almost certainly worth more
as a going concern than in liquidation. Unsecured creditors may thus
regard it as worth their while to accept a partial settlement rather than to
force termination of the business. The same reasoning may also apply to
LoanCo, even though LoanCo is nominally secured: inventory and
receivables evaporate fastest in the liquidation of a business of this sort.
Indeed, LoanCo may stand not only as the largest secured creditor of the
I1. A lawyer I know, with more compassion than may be apparent at first blush, calls them "the
poor bums in polyester." His point is helpful in understanding bankruptcy negotiation. The point is
that the trade creditors are typically far less likely to be arriving in Porsches, wearing Brooks Brothers
or Gucci, and far less likely to be sending their kids to fancy Eastern colleges, than anyone else in the
room-their own lawyers, their adversaries' lawyers, the bankers, or even, as if adding insult to injury,
the representatives of the debtor itself. Yet, it is the trade creditors who are being invited to make a
large voluntary surrender of their legal rights.
12. I have heard Elizabeth Warren describe it as a case where the creditor is trying to push the
debtor off a twenty-story building while the debtor is threatening to jump.
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
business, but also as the largest unsecured creditor. LoanCo may even find
it in its interest to "lend into the problem"-seemingly throwing good
money after bad-in order to salvage its position.' 3  OldBank, on the
other hand, appears to be fully secured and indeed may not even be
pressing hard for payment, because it knows that there is enough collateral
to satisfy its claim.
Veery's case makes a particularly appealing argument in favor of Chapter
11, for two overlapping reasons. First, the facts suggest the kind of case
in which "reasonable people" (whoever they are) might well want to reach
agreement to preserve going-concern values in any event. Second, there is
no specific suggestion of moral culpability here-the kind of culpability
that might argue in favor of liquidation as a kind of "punishment." Taken
together, these facts argue strongly for some sort of collective settlement,
whereby the debts are reduced and the business continues under the old
residual equity ownership.
The motivations for a collective settlement are so powerful that it may
be possible to reach a settlement out of court. Yet, there are many factors
that impel the case towards bankruptcy jurisdiction. Most, if not all,
involve the so-called "holdout problem." That is, out of court, there are
any number of ways in which a dissenting minority can scotch the wishes
of a unified majority. Chapter 11 provides the structure to impose an
allocation that state law does not afford. The most obvious example may
be the mandate to impose "equity of distribution" on unsecured creditors,
supplanting the "grab law" of state collection procedures. 4 Although this
might be the most obvious motive, it is far from the most important. Far
more interesting, perhaps, are the cases where the dissenter, by unilateral
action, can scotch the entire effort (as, for example, by levying on the
hypothetical essential device that the factory needs to make the firm go),
or the cases where the holdout, by virtue of being a holdout, can put herself
in a position to be bought off by the debtor.
13. The skill involved here is what passes under the name of "workout management," or, more
likely, something like "special procedures" or some other suitably opaque name for the management
of troubled debt. The place of good workout management is highly equivocal in bank hierarchy; one
does not want to admit that one needs good workout managers, and yet possession of such skills may
be the triumph of the banker's craft. One thinks of the old Soviet Union boasting that it had the best
AIDS treatment facilities in the world, but no AIDS patients. "It doesn't take a genius to loan $30
million," as the saying goes, "but it may take a genius to collect it."
14. I am aware, of course, that there is an immense body of literature surrounding the nature and
meaning of the concept of fairness in bankruptcy jurisdiction. But I think the street language is
sufficient for my current purpose.
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The Bankruptcy Code provides devices, not normally available at state
law, to deal with holdout problems of this sort. For example, the automatic
stay of § 362 embargoes unilateral action," while the confirmation
provisions of Chapter 11 provide for imposing the plan on a dissenting
minority. 6
But there is difficulty with the suggestion that Chapter 11 merely
replicates what "any reasonable person" would want. It tends to make truth
a matter of majority vote, and to obscure any discussion of what sorts of
reasons might be proper for dissenting from a particular course of action.
To take just one instance, it is likely that some unsecured creditors need the
debtor as a continuing customer, while others do not. Those who need the
debtor may be willing to sacrifice far more of their past claim than those
that do not. Dissent under these circumstances might be found "improper"
under some general principle or other, but it can hardly qualify as
"unreasonable." Matters of this sort tend to sort themselves out, if at all,
in debates over classification.
Turning to the matter of "culpability," there are a variety of complica-
tions. For instance, the above story was told as if the misfortunes landed
on the debtor out of the sky, unforeseeable and unpreventable. This is
surely the way the old managers may tell the story, and it may be true.
However, prudent creditors will scrutinize this version. Indeed, their views
as to continuation may very well depend on whether or not they believe
that the debtor is part of the solution or part of the problem. And here a
new set of complications arises, for the very idea of "culpability" needs
unpacking. It may be that the old managers, though well-intentioned, were
"the cause" of the problem because of their mismanagement. Or it may be
that they were scoundrels or charlatans. The creditor's calculus may differ
markedly depending on which way he interprets culpability in the particular
case. Ironically, the creditor may be more motivated to work with a
"manageable scoundrel"--e.g., by putting in an independent controller or
CEO-than with a well-meaning incompetent.
But there is a greater difficulty with this "paradigm case," and that is
whether any lawyer now living has ever actually seen it. Perhaps some
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Consistent with the general theme being developed here, it is worth
noting that the automatic stay serves two rather different purposes. One is to protect the debtor and her
"fresh start." The other is to protect the estate and its property. On principles set forth above, it is easy
to imagine cases that implicate one of these principles but not the other.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). One result is, of course, that a creditor who wants to control
a case may do so by buying up just enough debt to ensure that she cannot be voted down.
19941
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have. There are certainly no precise records classifying Chapter 11
bankruptcies on principles like those set down here. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the paradigm case is not only rare but may well be
entirely nonexistent. To get a better fix on Chapter 11, it is necessary to
review a number of other cases, beginning with the next set.
B. The Meaning of "Reorganization"
A central difficulty in devising a core meaning for Chapter 11 concerns
the concept of "reorganization." The drafters do not define it. Their
failure to do so seems to be intentional, and that may have been a wise
decision. Compare these two cases:
CASE 3A: Bobolink is a retail clothing dealer whose products have gone out
of fashion. He is not able to cover ordinary operating expenses, to say
nothing of debt service. Easter is approaching and creditors generally
concede that they would get more money if the business continues to operate
at retail through the upcoming Easter season. A substantial body of creditors
agree that present management, though it has lost its fashion touch, is
otherwise neither incompetent nor dishonest. A substantial majority of
creditors agree to advance new credit to permit the debtor to operate through
the Easter season. The creditors intend that the debtor will collect as much
as it can through retail sales and liquidate the remaining assets by any means
possible thereafter.
CASE 3B: Meadowlark is a seemingly prosperous retailer of health foods.
One day a delivery person arrives to find the store padlocked. Inquiry
discloses that existing owners have simply abandoned the property and
disappeared. Nonetheless, suppliers, who know each other and establish
contact easily, determine that Meadowlark is a viable business that will yield
more in operation than in liquidation. They therefore agree to seek a means
to continue the operations with creditors enjoying their ordinary priority and
the equity interest, if any, remaining in the old equity owners.
Each of these cases has a good claim on the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, yet their positions seem almost the opposite of what the
drafters envisioned. Bobolink clearly offers an opportunity for a "going-
concern liquidation." Bankruptcy will provide a mechanism for keeping
creditors at bay while the liquidation goes forward. In terms of ordinary
bankruptcy parlance, we think of liquidation as the province of Chapter 7,
where the trustee is enjoined to collect assets, to reduce them to cash, and
[VOL. 72:883
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to distribute them to creditors as their interests may appear. 7  Yet,
liquidation is authorized in Chapter 1.' And Chapter 11 has at least two
potential advantages over Chapter 7 in this case. Initially, this is a case
that requires the business to continue to operate (at least for a time);
operation is the rule in Chapter 11, while in Chapter 7 it is the excep-
tion.19 Probably more importantly, the Code requires a trustee in every
Chapter 7 case, while in Chapter 11, the norm is that the debtor remains in
possession, with the powers and obligations of a trustee.20 While there is
a good deal of analytical uncertainty over the precise role of the debtor-in-
possession (DIP), this seems to be a case where retaining the DIP is in the
interest of all.
Meadowlark is, in a sense, just the reverse: a case where the old equity
owners seem to have abandoned their position, even though they may have
an interest in the continued operation of the business. Ordinarily, in a
business of this sort, if there were any need for a bankruptcy, the DIP
would continue to operate the business pending its sale as a going concern.
Here, a DIP is impossible, yet a going-concern sale seems to make the
most sense. Thus, the appropriate course seems to be to appoint a trustee
and to let her sell the property as is, distributing proceeds to claimants as
their interests may appear. Such a scenario is possible under Chapter
11 -indeed, Chapter 11 pretty clearly foresees it. Yet on the facts of this
case, it will perhaps be easier in Chapter 7.
Thus, the distinction between Chapters 7 and 11 seems to be a blur. We
think of Chapter 7 as the "liquidation" chapter, and Chapter 11 as the
chapter for the preservation of the going concern. But liquidation is
possible in Chapter 11, and there is no barrier against using Chapter 7 to
preserve the values of the going concern. About the only (relevant) thing
that can be done in Chapter 11 but cannot be done in Chapter 7 is the
satisfaction of creditor claims by the issuance of stock. But even this may
be less of a barrier than meets the eye: if the old creditors really want the
business in Chapter 7, they may very well be able to reach it by forming
a company to buy the property from the trustee.
Indeed, Bobolink may be that rarest of all bankruptcy birds-a case
where an involuntary bankruptcy makes sense. There is an irony here:
there was a time when there was no such thing as a voluntary bankruptcy,
17. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1108, 721 (1988).
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 701-02 (1988).
1994]
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and one would no more expect the debtor to volunteer for bankruptcy than
one would expect him to volunteer for a full IRS field audit or a root canal.
As virtually everyone knows, voluntary bankruptcy is the norm today, and
involuntary the exception. Indeed, the arguments against an involuntary
bankruptcy are so compelling that the creditor in any case needs to think
two or three times before proceeding at all.2
C. Some Variations
This sketch merely begins to suggest the possibilities for Chapter 11, of
course. Without any pretense of being exhaustive, here are a few others:
CASE 4A: Turnstone, Inc. is the world's best-known maker of cheeseburger-
shaped nightlights. Although the field is competitive, Tumstone controls a
dominant market share. Sales and earnings grew briskly for several years,
but about a year ago Bufflehead, a competitor, developed a new version that
threatened to strip away Tumstone's market lead. Since then, Turnstone's
inventory has begun to pile up on the shelves, and Tumstone has started to
lose money on current operations. As its cash supply shrinks, it has tried
harder and harder to hang onto money for research and development. About
three weeks ago, Tumstone quit paying all but its most importunate trade
creditors. Turnstone is current on its inventory and receivables line to
LoanCo, but LoanCo has declared the collateral insufficient and has indicated
that it will call the loan. Management is convinced that it can get back into
the game if it receives a six-month grace period and a slug of new cash.
Goshawk, an investor who has never been involved with Tumstone, is willing
to lend the money if she can get the right security.
Turnstone bears a superficial resemblance to Veery in Case 2. In both
cases, the going-concern values probably exceed the liquidation values, and
in each case there may be a need for creditor coordination. The big
difference is that in Turnstone, the debtor's troubles are not the result of
some exogenous past event. On the contrary, Turnstone's success, if any,
depends on its getting new money for the future. The most important
contribution of the Bankruptcy Code will be the power it confers on the
court to authorize "super priority" lending. Thus, with the court's approval,
the debtor may be able to acquire new capital from Goshawk in exchange
for a claim equal or superior to all existing debt.
21. My guess is that a disproportionate number of involuntary bankruptcy cases are initiated by
one ex-spouse against the other. While there may be palpable issues at stake, one surmises that these
cases often involve litigants who need conflict as a form of intimacy, like King Pellinore and the
Questing Beast. War, says Clauswitz, is diplomacy by other means. The same may hold for the
relation between bankruptcy and divorce.
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CASE 4B: Titmouse runs a small factory in which it makes silk purses out
of sows' ears. It owes $3 million to LoanCo, secured by inventory and
receivables. It owes $500,000 to unsecured creditors. It conducts its
business on leased premises; the lease is "at the market," i.e., neither a
benefit nor a burden to the estate. It purchased all of its operating equipment
from vendors who secured their sales with purchase money security interests.
In all such cases, the value of the collateral equals the value of the loan.
Titmouse would sell for about $2.5 million as a going concern, but the
liquidation value is no more than $1 million.
Titmouse is another case where the solution is obvious-sell the business
as a going concern. Once again, this is a deal that might be consummated
outside of bankruptcy. But again, it is possible that bankruptcy will
provide for a "cleaner deal"-staying unilateral creditor action while the
deal is progressing, and providing for a full accounting of the disposition
of proceeds. As with the earlier cases, there is no inherent reason why the
bankruptcy has to be a Chapter 11, although Chapter 11 does make it easy
to continue the business and permits the debtor to continue in possession,
saving the expense of a trustee.
The most notable distinction between this case and the earlier cases is
that the only apparent beneficiary of a bankruptcy filing is the secured
creditor, because (if the numbers are accurate) there will not be anything
remaining after the sale for unsecured creditors. Under a traditional view,
this result argues against deploying bankruptcy jurisdiction in this case.
But this argument misses an important point: even though unsecured
creditors may receive nothing in this case, the mechanism provides them
with something that they do not ordinarily have outside bankruptcy-the
right to notice and the opportunity to be heard on important issues. This
ensures, at least, that unsecured creditors will have the chance to test the
assertions of value as they are alleged in the hypothetical. On a somewhat
more sinister note, the use of bankruptcy may offer a certain amount of
"nuisance leverage," impelling the secured creditor to pay off the
unsecureds in order to make them go away.
Variants of this case may arise when the bankruptcy forum provides a
more convenient arena than state law for secured creditors seeking to
liquidate their claims. For example, the pervasive jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court may make it easier to collect accounts receivable than do
ordinary state processes.
CASE 4c: Greenshank is a limited partnership. The general partner is a
corporation. The limited partners bought their interests under pre-1986 tax
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law, through which they acquired the right to deductions that would shield
other income. The only asset is an apartment house, Blackacre. Greenshank
acquired the apartment house for $4.2 million with $600,000 down and a
mortgage for twenty years at ten percent. When it was no longer able to
meet payments out of cash flow, Greenshank filed for relief under Chapter
11. The principal balance remaining on the mortgage was $3.8 million. An
independent appraiser says that the parties might be able to sell the property
for $3.2 million if they aggressively market it for six months.
In the past year or so, this type of case may have generated the most
discussion and (in terms of court and attorney time) perhaps also the most
litigation of all Chapter 11 cases. Although the property is obviously
insolvent, the real problem may not be apparent to the untutored eye. That
is, if the property goes to foreclosure, the investors lose not only their
residual claim, but also the substantial tax deductions they have enjoyed
over the years. They also face the prospect of "rollup liability": they have
to raise the money to pay taxes after the asset is gone.
Although it is easy to understand why the limited partners want
protection in this case, the fact is that these debtors have perhaps the least
persuasive claim on the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. I have
discussed this case at length elsewhere, so I will not go into detail here.22
But the point is that these facts present none of the traditional justifications
for a bankruptcy filing. Thus, there is no need for a discharge (the limited
partnership cannot get a discharge in any event); there is no need for
creditor orchestration (the senior secured claim alone exceeds the asset
value); and there is no need to preserve a going-concern value (the
apartment house will be an apartment house in any event). Indeed, one of
the principal embarrassments to debtor-proponents in cases of this sort is
their difficulty in creating enough of a semblance of creditor grievance to
create the appearance of a bankruptcy case.23
D. The Ambiguity of the "Personal"
Even taking all of this into account, there is still greater difficulty in
giving a core meaning to "reorganization." This difficulty is specifically
22. See John D. Ayer, Bankruptcy as an Essentially Contested Concept: The Case of the One-Asset
Case, 44 S.C. L. REv. 863 (1993).
23. See, e.g., In re Windsor on the River Associates, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec, (CRR) 1237 (1993). See
the exchange between Bruce A. Markell and me in Issues in Litigation, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER,
Dec. 1993, at 1-3.
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evident in the case of the closely held family corporation. Consider this
case:
CASE 5: Assume the facts in any of the preceding cases and add the fact that
the company president is Prez, who also owns sixty percent of the stock, with
the balance being held by members of his immediate family. Prez personally
guaranteed the debt of the lead secured creditor, and he is responsible by
statute for certain back taxes and unpaid wages.
Even though everything else remains the same, the presence of an owner-
manager almost certainly changes the dynamics of the case from the
standpoint of both debtor and creditor. It is inevitable that the interests of
Prez (and perhaps the interests of other insider-shareholders) will conflict
with the interests of ordinary unsecured creditors in the case. Prez wants
to make sure that the secured claim gets paid, along with the back taxes
and unpaid wages (because he is personally liable for those claims), but he
does not have nearly the same motivation to protect the unsecureds
(because he is protected by the corporate veil). Under the circumstances,
it seems that the inevitable course would be to make sure that Prez had
nothing to do with the case after filing.
Remarkably, just the opposite seems to be the case. Again, it is hard to
find precise data. But there is every reason to believe that most closely
held corporate bankruptcies involve "differential debt" of some sort. Yet,
the appointment of a trustee is not even remotely typical in bankruptcy
cases: far more commonly, the "debtor" (which is to say, Prez) remains in
position with the obligations (as the statute provides) of a trustee. It is easy
to get a discussion going regarding whether this modality is within the
"spirit" of bankruptcy law.
A case can easily be made for either side. On its face Chapter II treats
the retention of the DIP as the "rule," subject to variance "for cause." And
a good case can be made that the rule providing for the retention of the
DIP is designed only to protect creditors-i.e., by obviating the need for
extra cost and expense when the debtor can competently manage its own
affairs. But nothing in the Code suggests that it is so limited; rather, the
Code's definition of "cause" is terminally opaque.24 The necessary
inference is that the drafters intended for the distinction to be vague.
Accordingly, courts have shown understandable ambivalence about
whether and to what extent the DIP is really just a substitute for the trustee,
24. II U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988).
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and to what extent a different sort of creature. The issue appears in sharp
relief in the matter of avoiding powers. There is a two-year statute of
limitations within which a trustee must bring preference actions. Suppose
the case begins with a DIP, and a trustee is appointed later. The question
arises-does the two-year statute begin again, or does the trustee's time
include the DIP's time? One can approach the issue (as courts most often
do) as a problem of statutory interpretation; indeed, more careful drafting
could have resolved the issue long ago. However, this approach seems to
be based on a misunderstanding. Suppose, instead of a trustee succeeding
a DIP, the case was one in which a trustee succeeded another trustee. It is
almost inconceivable that it would occur to anyone to argue that the statute
of limitations, on the second appointment, begins running anew. The
reason it becomes an issue in the DIP-trustee case is that everyone
recognizes that the DIP is not likely to pursue voidable transfers alertly,
because so many of these transfers involve some sort of collusion between
the transferee and the person who now speaks for the DIP.
IV. OPERATING IN CHAPTER 11
A. The Polycentricity of the "Plan"
The foregoing suggests some of the limitations of trying to develop a
core definition for Chapter 11. It is possible to throw more light on the
problem by considering just how a "reorganization" might work itself out.
Consider this case:
CASE 6A: Ptarmigan makes widgets, which it sells for $100 per unit.
Variable costs (supplies, wages, etc.) are $60 per unit. There is a mortgage
on its factory for $40 million at ten percent interest. Ptarmigan has been
selling 80,000 units per year. Ptarmigan estimates that it needs $5 million
for deferred maintenance, product upgrade, and the like. With the extra
money, it believes that it could increase production to 115,000 units per year.
Although some things are clear from this brief statement, the case is
more important for what it leaves out rather than for what it says. As it
stands, Ptarmigan is losing money on every sale: the firm needs $4 million
per year for debt service alone. At the current price, it would need to sell
100,000 units per year just to break even." Add another $5 million in
25. 100,000 units at $100 per unit would provide $10 million in gross income, of which $4 million
would be used for debt service. The balance would go for operating costs.
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debt and the break-even point rises to 112,500 units per year." At this
level of production, the project would seem to be modestly profitable. 7
This is clear enough, but everything else is open to question. Will the
lender-any lender-be willing to provide the $5 million capital infusion?
That depends on the lender's appraisal of the probable outcomes, which are
never as certain as they appear in this kind of hypothetical. If there is no
infusion of new capital, something has to give. Three choices present
themselves: (1) raise prices (to $125 per unit);" (2) lower variable costs;
or (3) reduce debt service. Price policy is within the unilateral control of
Ptarmigan, so it does not normally become a part of the bankruptcy
negotiation.29 That leaves only two choices-reduce variable costs and/or
reduce debt service. In practice, a battle often arises between "the
employees" and "the banks," each fighting for a share of a necessarily
limited cash flow. Stated this starkly, it may appear that the banks have a
natural (if perhaps unfair) advantage, because their claims are "on the
balance sheet," while the employees, however much they may depend on
the debtor for continuing sustenance, hold claims that ap-
pear-transitorily--only "on the income statement."
There may be something to this for rhetorical purposes, but I think there
is less to it than meets the eye. What counts for both employees and banks
is a term that does not appear anywhere in the accounting documents-the
"opportunity cost," the question of what the parties could do with their
inputs if they did not have the present project." Thus, suppose that the
bank could not liquidate the plant at foreclosure for more than $30 million.
26. That is: 100(x) = $4.5 million + 60(x), so x = 112,500.
27. Since Ptarmigan must continue to pay variable costs regardless of how many units it produces,
its net cash flow after debt service would be 2,500 x $40 = $100,000. If 10% is the required rate of
return, then the capitalized value of this income stream is $1 million. All of this assumes that the inputs
are accurately priced; but see the discussion of opportunity cost infra note 30 and accompanying text.
28. $10 million - 80,000 = $125. This assumes that you can raise prices without losing demand.
Baldly stated, this is doubtful. But according to standard economic lore, if Ptarmigan is a "price-
seeker" rather than a "price-taker," there is no reason in principle to assume that the price given in the
problem maximizes income; the maximizing price may be higher or lower than $100.
29. This is not to say that prices are irrelevant to the bankruptcy process; think of the bankruptcy-
driven airline fare wars. My only point is that pricing does not occupy the same primacy in the
bankruptcy debate.
30. Just as an aside, I speculate that the notion of opportunity cost may be the single most
important concept in the development of modem finance, at least as it presents itself in law. It
underlies the Coase Theorem, well established as the single most important rhetorical trope. And it is
the principal distinction between the lore of modem finance (on the one hand) and traditional
accounting (on the other). The problem becomes important for lawyers when they try to cope with
the conflicting insights of these two communities.
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Then it makes sense to continue with the present project, even if it means
scaling down the implied capital value, as long as the resultant value
exceeds $30 million. Similarly, the employees' attitude may well depend
on what other alternatives they have if this business fails.
The preceding observation is readily apparent if one reflects on some of
the major bankruptcies of the 1980s. Some cases-Campeau is perhaps the
most obvious example-seem to have been the result of nothing more than
absurd overleveraging, where a balance sheet adjustment left behind a
functional, solvent business. Other cases-Continental I is the para-
digm-were driven by the income statement, where the case was resolved
on the backs of the employees. Still other cases-Wheeling Pitt is perhaps
notorious here-seem to have presented an instance of a state-of-the-art
plant (with attendant balance sheet liabilities) and a costly, inefficient labor
force, both of which had to be scaled down in order for the business to
survive.
For the sake of simplicity, I cast this as a conflict between capital and
labor. But the model fits other cases as well. For labor, substitute the
suppliers-the "credit surfers," (to use Lynn LoPuctd's apt phrase) who
ride from cycle to cycle on the waves of unsecured credit, always behind
the senior secured debt, often the de facto coventurers with the debtor, a
kind of quasi-equity.
B. "More Time"
As judge's jobs go, there is good reason to believe that the bankruptcy
judge's job, taken day for day, is one of the most interesting. Most of the
sheer dreariness takes place in the clerk's office and never comes to the
judge's attention. There are none of the gut-wrenching, soul-wrenching
personal issues that might be found in, say, domestic relations or criminal
sentencing. There are, as the saying goes, "no problems that money won't
solve." There is none of the tedium that must result from dealing, for
example, with the same drunk driving case, or auto accident, or drug crime
day in and day out.
In an important paper, Richard Levin put his finger on one good reason
why this is so.3 Levin pointed out that the core job of the bankruptcy
judge is prospective, not retrospective. She is recurrently called on to make
an estimate of whether and when a particular debtor can be restored to
31. Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV. 963
(1993).
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solvency. This necessarily involves her in a universe of evidence and
conceptual structure well beyond that which confronts the ordinary judge.
One can make too much of this, of course: all judges deal with the future,
as well as the past, and some do so a lot. However, it is doubtful that any
judge confronts the future so much in her regular work.
Why is the bankruptcy judge so involved in the future? The answer is
straightforward: the debtor always gains from more time. If the value of
the assets goes down, she only loses what she has. If they go up, her
return is potentially infinite. It is easy to formalize this point. As many
observers have noted, the position of the residuary equity owners in a
leveraged corporation is a call option, with the payoff value of the debt
serving as the strike price.32  A corollary point, also demonstrable as a
matter of option theory, is that the call option holder also gains value from
an increase in volatility. The combined teaching of these points is that the
debtor always has a motivation to take the assets and run another risk. The
basics of this intuition are clear to anyone who spends much time around
the bankruptcy court. The conventional formulation is that to let the debtor
continue in business after bankruptcy is, in effect, "gambling with other
people's money." I think that there is an element of truth in this formula-
tion, but it is sufficiently limited so as to be substantially misleading. To
explore the point, consider the following example:
CASE 6B: Towhee, Inc. is a debtor in a Chapter 1 1 case. The only asset is
$10 in the bank. The trustee can invest the money in any one of three
projects (A, B, and C), each of which has two possible returns, with a fifty
percent chance of each return.33 The probability-weighted34 expected
returns (gross present values) are as follows:
32. The general analytics of option pricing, and the implications for residuary equity, can be found
in any standard textbook on corporate finance. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1981). The mirror image of this "equity option" problem arises
when the equity owner tries to scale down the secured claim as he may be permitted to do under
Chapter 11, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988), but not under Chapter 7, see Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct.
773 (1992), nor under Chapter 13, id.
33. The binomial-return model seems "too simple," but it is no worse than any other stylized
model. If the binomial model works, then there is every reason to infer that the same would hold true
of a continuous probability distribution. Compare the treatment of options under the binomial option
pricing model and under the Black-Scholes option pricing formula, discussed in BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 32, at 438-41.
34. Let me dispose of a technicality here. It is an axiom that creditor-investors will prefer less
risk to more and demand compensation for bearing increased risk. But for present purposes, it is
perfectly possible to treat the probability-weighted sum as a certainty equivalent-i.e., a present value
in which the sums have already been discounted for risk.
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Project A = 0.5($45) + 0.5($55) = $50;
Project B = 0.5(0) + 0.5($120) = $60;
Project C = 0.5($10) + 0.5($80) = $45.
Suppose that the debts equal $75. As a matter of total probability-
weighting, the debtor is insolvent in any event, which would suggest that
the assets "belong to" the creditors. But until the hammer has fallen,
making the transfer final, the picture appears more complicated. To see
how this can be, consider the differential payouts for each of the two
parties, equity and debt. First, here are the probability-weighted values
of the prospective returns to debt:
Project A = $50 (just as in the earlier case);
Project B = 0.5(0) + 0.5($75) = $37.50;
Project C = 0.5($10) + 0.5($75) = $42.50.
And now, to equity:
Project A = 0;
Project B = 0.5(0) + 0.5($45) = $22.50;
Project C = 0.5(0) + 0.5($5) = $2.50.
To understand the implications of these numbers, first consider the case
where the only available choices are A and C. Debt will clearly prefer A
over C because it has the higher probability-weighted value, measured
either from the standpoint of debt alone ($50 over $42.50), or from the
standpoint of the assets of the firm taken as a whole ($50 over $45).
Equity, of course, will favor C over A, because that is the only project
under which it has any chance of recovery.
In a conventional Chapter 11 scenario, chances are that the court will
side with debt rather than equity, ruling that equity's rights will be cut off,
and this might well be the right decision. But it is one thing to identify the
decision, and quite another to name the reason. If the court decides that
equity has no rights because (as is so often the grounds of decision) equity
has no "property," or because (identically) the property "belongs" to debt,
then it is being circular: the plaintiff wins because he has property, and has
property because he wins. Equity does have a definable interest-the
contingent upside. Whether it will be permitted to assert or vindicate that
interest is a separate matter. If the court decides that creditors win because,
e.g., a contractual or statutory termination has expired, then the court may
or may not be correct, but at least it is being coherent.
But suppose that, instead of being presented with A and C, the court is
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presented with A and B. It seems to me that these facts present quite a
different problem. Once again, of course, debt will favor Project A, the
less volatile alternative and the one offering the creditors the higher return.
Meanwhile, equity, as the holder of an out-of-the-money option, will
readily prefer the more volatile B, which is the only one that gives it any
chance of recovery.
The difficulty is that this time, the more volatile project is the more
valuable one, not merely from the standpoint of equity but also from the
standpoint of the assets taken as a whole. If the court decides for creditors
in this case, it must recognize that it is doing so to satisfy the creditors'
taste for risk aversion at the expense of the values of the asset pool as a
whole."
If this instance seems trivial or uninteresting, consider the case where the
debts are not $75, but $55. In this case, the relevant payoffs are as
follows, first for debt:
Project A = 0.5($45) + 0.5($55) = $50;
Project B = 0.5(0) + 0.5($55) = $27.50;
Project C = 0.5($10) + 0.5($60). = $35.
And for equity:
Project A = $0;
Project B = 0.5(0) + 0.5($65) = $32.50;
Project C = 0.5(0) + 0.5($20) = $10.
As between A and C, creditors will prefer A, and the court is likely to
go along with them, for all the same reasons. As between A and B,
creditors will again favor A and equity will favor B, but with a difficul-
ty-if the choice is B, then the company is solvent in the balance sheet
sense (assets > liabilities). Under standard rhetoric, if the court favors A
over B, it is, in effect, permitting the creditors to gamble with the debtor's
money, rather than the other way around. The difficulty here may lie in
the definition of solvency: we treat solvency as if it were a "snapshot";
either the debtor is solvent, or she is not. Numbers like those in this
35. Here is a complication. The cost to creditors in shifting from A to B is $50 - $37.50 = $12.50.
But the gain to equity is $22.50 - $0 = $22.50. Thus, if the initial position is A, then it is rational for
equity to pay debt any price up to $22.50 to induce debt to shift from A to B. And at any price above
$12.50, it is rational for debt to take the inducement. The spread ($22.50-$12.50) represents the
"decision space" between two indifference curves where there is room for a Pareto-maximizing
exchange. The numbers seem right, but I cannot identify any actual case where this logic seems to have
been a factor.
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example make it clear that solvency is perhaps better understood as a
continuum, although nothing in the law allows this kind of choice.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper could be a lot longer. There are many other shadowy
distinctions in bankruptcy law-boundaries that are at least intricate, and
at most permanently contested. Some of them have been written about at
length elsewhere. For example, in a series of articles, I explored the
nondistinction between "security interest" and "lease," noting, inter alia, the
anomalous way in which the distinction plays out in bankruptcy court.36
David Gray Carlson has written an important article on the distinction (if
there is one) between "contract" and "rule" in the reorganization process-a
"contract" being something that is reducible to a dollar liability, a "rule"
being something that the debtor must abide by in any event.37 Robert
Weisberg has detailed the overlapping and often conflicting mandates that
arise from the two different motivations for preference law-the motive of
promoting "equity" among creditors on the one hand and the motive of
punishing the debtor on the other.3" There are other potential topics that
do not seem to have received the attention they deserve.
But that is not this paper. This paper is, to repeat: there is no "essence"
to Chapter 11. Rather, Chapter 11 serves a variety of purposes, overlap-
ping and superficially similar, yet often in tension. But it does not follow
that one must lament this kind of ambiguity. Rather, there is good reason
to believe that the drafters intended just this sort of thing.
36. See John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity ofthe Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 667 (1983);
John D. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341.
37. David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors" Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 453
(1993).
38. Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, The Merchant Character, and the Histoy of the
Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1986).
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